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I.
INTRODUCTION
This case alleges that Toole County turned plaintiffs land into the functional
equivalent of a park. Had the County physically seized plaintiffs land and made it a
park, the County would obviously owe plaintiff compensation. The essence of plaintiff s
Takings claim is that the County's regulatory actions had the same effect. By precluding
all economically viable use of the property, plaintiffs land has been set aside for public
policy reasons, but with the plaintiff being asked to bear the cost. The County may have
valid reasons for precluding the only possible private use of plaintiff s land, but the effect
is that plaintiffs property has been rendered valueless because of the County's desire to
provide a benefit for the general public. This is the precise situation the Takings Clause
was designed to address. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "One of the principal
purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.'" Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
Defendant's argument, like the trial court's decision, focuses on the fact that Toole
County had the right to exercise its discretion and deny plaintiffs mining permit request.
This is an attempt to frame this case as a claim asserting the wrongful denial of a permit
request. That is not what this case is about. This case alleges that the government's
regulatory actions, though a proper exercise of its regulatory discretion, constituted a
"Taking" of plaintiff s property.

1

If defendant's position were correct, the viability of a Takings claim would turn on
the validity of the government's actions. If the government had the discretion to deny a
permit request, the logic of defendant's position is that there could be no Takings claim,
because the property owner would have had no reasonable expectation of using the
property in the manner requested in the permit. This is, however, the exact opposite of a
proper Takings analysis.
Takings claim assume the legitimacy of the regulatory action. In cases where the
landowner seeks to dispute the legitimacy of the government's actions, plaintiffs bring a
challenge - usually a due process claim - to the legality of the regulatory action. If the
regulatory action is found improper, it is reversed, and the plaintiffs get the requested
permits. Takings claims, in contrast, arise when there is no basis on which to challenge
the lawfulness of the government's actions. The essence of a Takings claim is that the
government's actions, even though lawful, had such a substantial impacl on the property
owner's rights that the government must pay compensation for the impact of the
governmental regulation. Takings claims focus on the effect of the governmental action,
the lawfulness of which is assumed. Consistent with this, the relief afforded by Takings
claims is monetary compensation, not reversal of the government's action.
Takings claims are much less common than due process challenges to regulatory
actions, because Takings claims require that the permit denials have a very severe impact
on the value of the land. A categorical Taking, for example, arises only in the rare case
in which a regulatory action removes all economic value from land. This case, however,
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is that rare case. The County's denial of the permit left no alternative uses for plaintiffs
land.
This failure to distinguish between Takings claims and claims that challenge the
validity of the regulatory actions pervades defendant's entire presentation. The vast
majority of the cases cited by defendant, for example, are due process challenges to the
validity of a government's regulatory act, not Takings claims. Similarly, defendant
argues that plaintiff should be required to pursue a state law remedy under Utah Code §
17-27-1001, a section that deals with challenges to the legitimacy of regulatory actions,
not Takings claims.
To understand why defendant dwells at such length on due process cases, rather
than Takings cases, the Court need look no farther than the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct.
2886 (1992). Lucas held that if a regulatory action eliminates all economic use of a
parcel of property, there has been a categorical Taking and compensation is required.
This seminal Takings decision is virtually on all fours with the facts of this case, and
simply cannot be distinguished by defendant. Defendant, however, spends less than two
pages on this decision, and only after a lengthy discussion of numerous due process cases
involving challenges to the legitimacy of regulatory actions.
This reply brief, therefore, will first show that Lucas cannot be distinguished, and
that defendant has attempted to create a legal argument that avoids Lucas by relying on
inapposite due process case law. Plaintiff will then address defendant's remaining
arguments.
3

II.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
IN LUCAS IS SQUARELY ON POINT
WITH THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
To briefly review the facts, the plaintiff in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), bought two residential beachfront lots for
the purpose of building single-family homes. After the purchase, the legislature passed a
Beachfront Management Act, and regulations issued pursuant to that Act barred the
plaintiff from building any habitable structures on his land. The plaintiff acknowledged
the legitimacy of the legislation, but prevailed on his Takings claim because the trial
court found that the government's actions rendered the parcels valueless. The Supreme
Court upheld the Takings claim, ruling that regulatory actions that deprive property
owners of all economically viable use of their property constitute categorical Takings that
automatically entitle the property owners to compensation. This is precisely the claim
made here, that legitimate regulatory action had the effect of depriving the plaintiff of all
economic value in its land. Under the holding of Lucas', this constitutes a categorical
Taking, and if proven at trial, compensation must be paid.
Defendant first tries distinguish Lucas based on the fact that the legislation and
regulations in Lucas that barred the plaintiffs use of his land were enacted after he
purchased the property. Defendant argues that this fact distinguishes Lucas from this
case, because the regulatory scheme at issue here was in place before plaintiff bought the
property. (Def. Br. at 24) That attempted distinction of Lucas based on the time when
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the regulatory scheme came into existence, however, has been squarely rejected by a
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001), the plaintiff
owned a parcel of waterfront land. He brought a Takings claim when his development
proposals were repeatedly denied by the local government because of potential damage to
a salt marsh. The Rhode Island regulations under which these development proposals
were denied were even stricter than those at issue here, because landowners wishing to
fill in a salt marsh needed a "special exception" from a regulatory body that had the full
discretion to deny all such requests. Id. at 613.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied plaintiffs Takings claim principally
because the plaintiff acquired the property after the applicable salt march regulation were
put into effect. The court reasoned, just as defendant argues here, that since the
regulations were in effect before he became the owner, "the right to fill wetlands was not
part of the title he acquired." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a regulation deprives a property owner
of all economically viable use, there has been a Taking, and it does not matter that the
regulations were in effect at the time the owner acquired the property. 533 U.S. at 62629, 121 S.Ct. at 2462-64.
Under defendant's line of reasoning, there should have been no Takings claim in
Palazzolo, because the property owner should have had no protected property interest in
the construction permit he sought and was denied. The Supreme Court, however, held
that the sole issue was the effect of the governmental action on the property owner's
5

ability to use his or her property. If it deprives the property of all value, there has been a
Taking, regardless of whether the regulation was in effect prior to the plaintiffs purchase
of the property. Defendant's attempt to distinguish Lucas based on the time when the
regulatory scheme went into effect, therefore, must fail. Indeed, plaintiff cited Palazzolo
on this very point in its initial brief, and defendant never discusses or attempts to
distinguish its holding.
Defendant also tries to distinguish Lucas based on the fact that the plaintiff "paid a
premium price for the property based upon its beachfront location and the previous
approval of two residential lots in a [nearby] subdivision...." (Def. Br. at 24) There are
two problems with this. First, the price the plaintiff in Lucas paid for his lots played no
role in the Court's decision. Defendant does not cite to any part of the decision or to any
holding that was impacted by this fact. Second, as defendant acknowledges, plaintiff
bought the land at issue here solely for the purpose of mining gravel, and was assured by
a County official that the necessary permit would be granted. Thus, while there is no
evidence in the record of the price paid, plaintiff obviously paid a price that assumed the
land's value as a gravel pit.
Finally, defendant makes the following misleading statement about Lucas:
the Lucas court noted that regulatory limitations which "inhere in the title
itself are biding on the purchase of the property. (Def. Br. at 24)
This is not a fair characterization of the decision or the quoted passage. Lucas is
quite clear that regulatory schemes that eliminate all economic value in property
constitute a Taking. Indeed, if regulatory schemes can't cause a Taking, the Lucas
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decision makes no sense, because it was a regulatory scheme that caused the Taking in
Lucas.
The error in defendant's characterization of Lucas arises from the fact that the
quoted passage was not dealing with legislative regulatory schemes, but rather with
inherent limitations on property rights that have nothing to do with government imposed
regulatory schemes. 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. at 2900 ("Any limitation so severe
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself..."). As the Court explained, there might be not a Taking:
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire or to forestall
other grave threats to the lives and property of others.
112 S.Ct. at 2900, n.16.
What the Court was pointing out is that there are certain inherent limitations in the
very ownership of property. These inherent limitations on what it means to own property
do not constitute Takings because they are never part of the bundle of rights that
constitutes what property owners have under our legal system. This principle has no
application here because, by defendant's admission, we are dealing with a discretionary
decision under a regulatory scheme.
These points constitute defendant's sole attempt to distinguish Lucas. Their
failure shows that the trial court, which did not discuss Lucas (although it was
extensively discussed in the briefs), erred. Under Lucas, the validity of the County's
permit denial has no impact on a Takings claim. The sole issue is whether the effect of
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the government's action was to eliminate all economically viable use of plaintiff s land,
and this is an issue that requires a trial.
III.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS A "PROPERTY INTEREST"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Defendant states that a Takings claim requires a "protectable interest in property."
That statement is correct. Defendant then argues that plaintiff had no protectable interest
in a gravel pit permit, and therefore has no protectable property interest on which to base
a Takings claim. This argument is flatly incorrect.
Plaintiffs protectable property interest is the fee simple ownership of the land in
question, and that ownership is an undisputed fact. That interest is the basis of the
Takings claim. Defendant incorrectly focuses on the permit, when this action involves
the regulatory Taking of plaintiff s land.
If defendant's analysis were correct, there would have been no Takings claims in
Lucas, Palazzolo, or any of the other numerous cases involving regulatory Takings. In
both Lucas and Palazzolo, landowners sought, but were denied, the right to develop their
land. In both cases, the government's actions were deemed lawful, and the landowners
therefore had no "protected interest" in gaining permission to develop their land. Both
cases involved Takings, however, because the plaintiffs owned property, and it was the
right to use their property in some economically viable fashion that was taken.
A good illustration of the flaw in defendant's position is City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999), a case in which a
property owner sued because the City of Monterey had repeatedly rejected his
8

development plans for certain property. The trial court held that the City "did not violate
[plaintiffs] substantive due process rights because the City asserted valid regulatory
reasons for denying [plaintiffs] development application." Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996). Under defendant's
logic, this should also have disposed of plaintiff s Takings claim because the developer
would not have had a protectable property interest in having his application approved.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, affirmed an award in plaintiffs favor under a Takings
theory because a jury found that the denial of the development plan left the property
without any economically viable use.1
The fact that ownership of real property constitutes a protectable interest under the
Takings Clause is so well established that it is hardly discussed in the case law. For
example, although a Takings claim requires a property interest, there is no discussion of
this issue in either Lucas, Palazzolo or City of Monterey. The reason for this is that when
real property is involved, the existence of a protectable property interest is so obvious
that it goes unchallenged.
The question of whether there is a protectable property interest does arise when
something less than a fee interest in property is at issue. Thus, for example, in Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held
that both implied easements and leaseholds constitute protected property interests within

1

This plaintiff in City of Monterey purchased the property from another developer after
many prior development applications had been turned down. 95 F.3d at 1425. This case,
therefore, also refutes defendant's argument that there can be no Takings claim if the
regulatory scheme is in place prior to the plaintiffs purchase of the property.
9

the meaning of the Takings clause. In Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful
City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme court held that property and
the buildings on that property constitute property interests protected by the Takings
clause. If easements, leaseholds and buildings constitute protectable property interests
under the Takings Clause, the actual ownership of property obviously does as well.
Defendant attempts to fashion an argument that plaintiff had no protected property
interest based on cases that involve due process challenges to the validity of a regulator's
rejection of a permit or development proposal. These cases are conceptually
distinguishable because they focus on whether the landowner had a right to a specific
development plan or permit, and whether the denial of that specific request was lawful.
The "property" interest at issue is not the underlying ownership of the land, as it is in a
Takings claim, but rather the right to proceed with a specific development plan. The
regulatory action does not eliminate all economically viable use for the land; it merely
precludes the particular development sought by the landowner.
Thus, when due process cases talk about the existence of a protectable property
interest, they are determining whether the landowner had a right - a protectable property
interest - to proceed with a specific development plan. These decisions have no
application to Takings claims, which are not concerned with the right to proceed on any
specific development plan, but rather with the fact that the regulatory action had
effectively "taken" the underlying property by eliminating all economic use for that
property.
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Thus, for example, defendant cites Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226
F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000), where a landowner sued to overturn a decision denying it the
right to develop its property in a certain manner. There was no claim that the decision
deprived the owner of all economic use of the land, and thus no Takings claim. The sole
legal claim was that the denial of a particular development plan deprived the developer of
property without due process of law. The court held that the question of whether a
refusal to approve a particular development plan violates the due process clause turns on
whether there existed:
a set of conditions exist under state and local law, "the fulfillment of which
would give rise to a legitimate expectation" that the City Council would
approve Hyde Park's plat. Id. In other words, Hyde Park must show that
under the applicable law, the City Council had limited discretion to
disapprove the proposed plat. "Otherwise, the city's decision making lacks
sufficient substantive limitations to invoke due process guarantees."
The issue in Hyde Park, therefore, as it is in all due process regulatory claims, is
whether the property owner had a legitimate expectation - and therefore a protectable
property interest - of getting a specific plan or permit approved by a regulatory authority.
It is in this context that courts hold that the question of whether the property owner had a
protected property interest in a permit turns on whether the regulator had the discretion to
deny the permit. If the government had the discretion to deny a plan or permit request,
there is no protectable property interest in that specific request. This has nothing to do
with a Takings claim in which the denial removed all value from the plaintiffs property.
It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to plead in the alternative both due process and
Takings claims in the same case, alleging that the government's actions were unlawful,
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but if they were lawful, they constituted a Taking. A example of this is City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999). As noted
earlier, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs due process claim because the City had valid
reasons for denying the property owner's application for a development project on its
land. Under defendant's legal theory, since the City had the discretion to deny the
application, there could be no Takings claim because the property owner would have had
no protectable property interest in having that development application approved. A
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the Takings claim in that case, however, was
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court because of a finding at trial that the denial of the
development application eliminated all economically viable use for the property.
Another example of the distinction between due process and Takings claims is a
case cited by defendant, Henry v. Jefferson County Planning Comm 'n, 148 F.Supp.2d
698 (N.D.W.Va. 2001) (Def. Br. at 17). That case involved the government's denial of a
request for a conditional use permit to build town homes. Defendant quotes a passage
from this opinion to the effect that denial of a conditional use permit does not affect a
protectable property interest. The quoted section, not surprisingly, comes from that part
of the opinion denying a due process claim based on the rejection of the town home
development plan.
Defendant ignores the fact, however, that the plaintiff also brought a Takings
claim alleging that the permit denial deprived him of all economically viable use of his
property. The court rejected this claim, but not because there was no property interest.
Rather, this claim was rejected because:
12

defendants' actions, in allegedly foreclosing the option of rebuilding the
restaurant and denying Henry's application for a conditional use permit, did
not deny Henry of all economical use of the Town Run Property. On the
contrary, the Ordinance expressly permits Henry to operate a farm, single
family dwellings, mobile homes, markets for the sale of farm products and
other uses. Therefore, the defendants' actions did not deprive Henry all
economical use of the Town Run Property.
Id. at 707-708.
This once again illustrates the distinction between the two claims. The due
process claim was denied because the landowner had no right to expect to have the
conditional use permit approved, or in due process terms, had no protected property
interest in the conditional use permit. That, however, had no bearing on the Takings
claim, which was denied because the landowner failed to prove that the permit denial was
a Taking of his property. One claim focuses on the regulatory action, the other on the
effect on the landowner's ability to use his or her property.
Defendant states in a footnote that due process and Takings claims involve the
same analysis. (Def. Br. at 17, n.5) The only case cited in support of this proposition,
however, Rocky Mountain Materials & Asphalt Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm *rs of El Paso
County, 972 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1992), addressed only the question of when a claim is
ripe for court review. The court held that for both due process and Takings claims
landowners must exhaust any available state administrative procedures. Nothing in that
decision undermines the very clear distinction between the protectable property interests
involved in due process claims - which concern the loss of a particular development plan
- and Takings claims - which concern the effect of legitimate regulatory actions on the
ownership of land.
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This, then, explains why the defendant cites so many cases holding that the denial
of a permit does not involve the denial of constitutionally protected property interest.
Every cited case for this proposition is a due process decision. Defendants have failed
to cite a single Takings claim in which a permit was denied, the result of which was to
deprive a landowner of all economic value in the property, and the court held there was
no Takings claim because the right to a permit is not a protected property interest. No
such cases are cited because they do not exist. Ownership of property is the issue in a
Takings claim, and a permit denial can constitute a Taking if it has a sufficient effect on
the rights of ownership in that property.
IV.
THE COUNTY'S DENIAL OF THE PERMIT
WAS BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE REQUEST
Defendant correctly states that property owners must meaningfully pursue
governmental approval for proposed uses of their property before bringing Takings
claims. As plaintiff pointed out in its initial Brief, this issue is referred to as ripeness, and
it sensibly requires a denial on the merits by the regulator before a Takings claim can
proceed. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot pursue a Takings claim because plaintiff
never meaningfully pursued the permit application process:

2

The few Takings Clause cases cited by defendant that discuss the existence of a
protectable property interest deal with whether something other than real property
constitutes a protectable property interest. See, Maritrans, Inc. v. U.S., 342 F.3d 1344
(Fed.Cir. 2003) (right to use barges); Mclntyre v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003)
(inmates right to interest on prison trust account); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 104 S.Ct. 2862 (1984) (environmental data submitted to EPA).
14

Diamond effectively abandoned its conditional use application
without ever making any real attempt to provide the County with sufficient
information regarding the potential adverse impacts of a gravel operation at
that specific site. It did not assist the County in determining what, if any,
conditions might mitigate those impacts at that particular location. (Def.
Br. at 21-22)
Diamond abandoned the application process and forced the adverse
decision based on the dearth of support." (Def. Br. at 28)
There is absolutely no basis for this argument in the record, much less a basis for
contending that this "abandonment" is shown by undisputed facts. The ultimate decision
to deny plaintiffs permit request was made by the Tooele County Board of
Commissioners. The statements of the two Commissioners who voted to deny the permit
requests are the best (and arguably the only) evidence of why it was denied:
Commissioner White stated his reasoning for being opposed to this is that
he feels the health and safety of the citizens of Stockton can be in danger if
that type of thing is put within that short of distance of the housing. "We're
talking between lA and lA of a mile and lA mile, somewhere in that range. I
think it would definitely reduce the quality of life of the people whom
might live there as well. I think the health and safety has a compelling
interest over the landowner's use...."
Commissioner Rockwell stated he would echo the same thing. Because of
the proximity to the Town of Stockton and its citizens, this property is not
the place to put the gravel pit and related operations.
(Rec. 160,64).
These statements show unequivocally that the decision was not based on a failure
to provide information or an "abandonment" of the application process. Quite to the
contrary, these two Commissioners confronted the permit request head on, and found that
they did not want a gravel pit on this location, period. There is nothing further plaintiff
could have done.

15

Prior to the Commissioners' ruling, the Planning Commission made a
recommendation to the Commissioners that the permit request be denied. In the Planning
Commission's report there is a recommendation of a denial on the merits for the
following reasons, which do not include a failure of some kind on the part of the plaintiff:
•
Professors from the University of Utah had shown that the Stockton Bar
was a unique "geoantiquity" that should not be disturbed.
•
The County Engineer feared that the mine would disrupt the bar's function
as an air dam and change the region's climate and temperature.
•
The Mayor of Stockton stated that there would be adverse environmental
impact on the community.
•
The proposed pit would be located within % mile of a residential area and
would give off odors and dust.
•

Residents were concerned about numerous health and safety issues.

(Rec. 161-60, 72; see also, Rec. 77).
This matter is before the Court on summary judgment. Defendant, therefore, must
demonstrate that the undisputed facts show an "abandonment" of the permit application.
Frankly, if there were to be a ruling as a matter of law, it would have to be that the permit
request was denied on the merits and the Takings claim is ripe. Both the
recommendation of the Planning Commission and the statements of the County
Commissioners are unequivocal in denying the request because they did not want a
gravel pit at this location under any circumstances, and there is no contrary evidence
showing that the application was denied because plaintiff failed to make a necessary
showing or in some other way abandoned the application process. For the purposes of
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this appeal, however, it is sufficient to show that there is no basis for a summary
judgment ruling against the plaintiff on this point.
V.

DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE COURT
COULD NOT BASE A RULING ON A "FINDING" THAT THE
PROPERTY HAS OTHER ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USES.
Plaintiffs reading of the trial court's decision was that that the Takings claim must
be dismissed for the additional reason that there are other economically viable uses for
plaintiffs property. Defendant does not attempt to defend this ruling, but rather argues
that this was a "simple observation" that was "dictum." (Def. Br. at 29-30) In effect,
defendant is conceding that the summary judgment decision cannot be upheld on this
basis. This, therefore, is no longer an issue on this appeal.
VI.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM CANNOT BE ADDRESSED
THROUGH UTAH CODE ANN. $ 17-27-1001
Defendant's citation of this statute is another illustration of its confusion of
Takings claims with due process claims that challenge the reasonableness of regulatory
rulings. Utah Code § 17-27-1001 allows courts to "determine only whether or not the
[regulatory] decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Plaintiff does not claim,
however, that the denial of the permit was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." The claim is
that this lawful denial had a sufficiently devastating effect on the value of plaintiff s
property such that it constitutes a regulatory Taking under Lucas.
A proceeding under § 17-27-1001 would require plaintiff to show that "it is
entitled to the conditional use permit...." Plaintiff cannot make such a showing, and
17

moreover, it need not make such showing for a Takings claim. It is time to address the
Takings issue. The County has decided that plaintiff cannot operate a gravel pit on its
land and a trial is now needed to determine whether that decision constitutes a Taking
under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions.
CONCLUSION
For the reason stated herein and in plaintiffs initial brief, Plain tiff-Appellant
Diamond B-Y Ranches respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
decision summary judgment order and remand this case for a trial on the merits.

YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
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Allen K . # y ^
Attorney for plaintiff
Diamond B-Y Ranches
Allen K. Young
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75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
801-379-0700
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